The Erdogan Era: Legacy, Power, and the Remaking of Modern Türkiye
Abstract
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) era, commencing in 2002, represents a transformative and revolutionary period in Turkish politics. It systematically dismantled and replaced the Kemalist establishment’s long-standing control over the state's ideology, key institutions, and collective memory. As the "official" state tradition and the foundational ideology upon which the Republic was constructed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Kemalism was designed to be immutable and guarded by the state institutions and non-governmental organizations. The Kemalist system was seen as the permanent foundation of the Turkish Republic, characterized by its secular and nationalist principles.
In contrast, the AKP, a party rooted in political Islam, fundamentally disagreed with Kemalism's strict secular regulations. The AKP did more than just govern; it completely transformed the Kemalist state, representing a highly significant and unexpected historical shift. This paper aims to examine “how the AK Parti and Erdogan era represent a dramatic change in Turkish politics?”.
Key Words
Kemalism – AK Parti – Erdogan – Islamism
Kemalism and Its Legacy
The first political party of the new regime, named as “Republican People’s Party” (CHP), established by the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. As the founder president of the Turkish Republic, one of the main goals of Ataturk was to remove the causes of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and to build a ‘nation state’ on stable foundations (Ciftci, 2013). Accordingly, Kemalism, also referred to as “Atatürkçülük”, is a political philosophy or ideology which was created by Kemal Ataturk and used by CHP. Hence, “Kemalism” was the core ideology and basis for the new Republic since the emergence of the state, and it became the state's political tradition.
In the early years of the Republic, CHP used education as the main way to spread Kemalist ideas. Education was perceived as a tool for spreading the views of the new elite. As a result, the CHP governments tried to raise 'new citizens' (Bilgiç, 2017). The Kemalist regime placed the ideals of Kemalism in every field as much as they could, from government offices to bureaus and agencies. They especially forced the Kemalist ideology in schools, which are the places for shaping young minds. Anthems, oaths, flags and maps are the tools to create a sense of pride and love about nations. Moreover, Ataturk’s portrait, his statue and his addresses to youth, always being a part of the schools as mandatory. Consequently, the first generation of the republic was shaped by the strictly controlled ideological and political system of the Kemalist one-party regime and this era generated different social groups within society.
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| Statue and words of Ataturk in an ordinary school in Turkiye |
On one side were radical opponents who accused Kemalism of being a fundamentally anti-Islamist ideology that eliminated the core principles of the Ottoman state and marginalized Islam from the public sphere. On the other side were defenders of Kemalism, whose allegiance was rooted in the establishment of modern Turkey and who held Ottoman traditions and anti-secularism responsible for the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. They portrayed Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as ‘the immortal leader and unrivalled hero’ (Guida, 2021). Both groups played their political roles as a ‘savior’ from the others as imagined as ‘evil’ for the state and its future.
Kemalism marked secularism as one the core and founding principles for the republic and the CHP. But, as a belief system, Islam also has an administrative and law system (Sharia) that relies on the unity of religion and the state, and it rejectes the idea of separation of religion and state. In order to apply secularism in a society dominated by Islam, Kemalist secularism differed by its logic and way to execute. Despite the general understanding, Kemalist secularism is not only based on the separated system of state and religion, but on bringing religion under the control of the governing regime. In the light of this, religious officials, religious education, holidays, prayer places, religious lessons (khutbah), and even the worshipping times have been under the control of the state, via the Directorate of Religious Affairs as a state branch.
In the early years of the Republic, the CHP administration implemented a series of radical secularization reforms to separate religion from state affairs and bring religious life under government control. Key examples include the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, which ended the centuries-old religious leadership of the Islamic world, and the closure of dervish lodges and shrines (tekke and zaviye) to curb the influence of religious orders. Additionally, the government replaced the traditional Arabic call to prayer with the Turkish Adhan (ezan), mandated the use of the Latin alphabet over Arabic script, and moved the weekly holiday from Friday to Sunday to reach the upper-level of contemporary civilizations (muasır medeniyetler seviyesi). These strict regulations implemented in the early years of the Republic remain a major subject of discussions and a source of strong criticism for Islamists to Kemalism even today.
Why is AKP and Kemalism a “rival” for each other?
The primary rivals to Kemalism have been threefold. There are Islamism, Kurdish Nationalism and other minor ideologies. And the leading rival to Kemalism has been “Islamism” among these three rivals. The AK Parti, as a political party rooted by Milli Görüş (National Outlook) and Islamism, has been a representative as an “other” for the Kemalist political ideology. This rivalry led to so many radical social and political changes in Modern Turkiye. This triggered the muslim population and led to the rise of Islamist political parties to power.
The rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power in 2002 can be strongly linked to the consequences of the Kemalist establishment’s highly centralized and strictly secularizing reforms. The Kemalist regime, while building the modern Republic, followed an aggressive program to dismantle the Ottoman-Islamic tradition and marginalize religious identity from the public sphere as mentioned above. This program of the one-party regime was perceived as fundamentally anti-Islamist by a large segment of the religious conservative population and created a powerful and long-term resentment.
A very popular Islamist theorist and author Kadir Mısıroğlu, even wish “if only the Greeks had won” in the National Struggle, in which he affirmed that even the Greek invaders of Anatolia would have done less harm to Turkish identity and institutions than the One-Party regime (Guida, 2025). His opposition got many supporters and influenced others. This religious and cultural revolution ultimately fueled the counter-mobilization of Islamist political movements, such as the Milli Görüş movement, that birthed the AKP. By offering a political vehicle rooted in Islamism and promising to restore religious freedom and conservative values, the AKP effectively capitalized on the deep-seated societal division created by the strict Kemalist secular project, leading to its electoral victory and following transformation of the Turkish state.
Actually, the real difference lies in the fact that both points believe the country's prosperity and salvation lie in their different ideological ideas. In essence, Kemalism argues that the survival of the new Turkish state, unlike the Ottomans, can only be ensured through a more Westernized and secular order. In contrast, the Islamist side (represented by the AKP and the Milli Görüş movement) believes that the Turkish state and its people will prosper if they abandon the Kemalism and return to the values of the Ottoman era, which are rooted in Islamic-Turkish traditions, customs, and laws.
While Kemalism increased its legitimacy by portraying a state that had already collapsed and was then rebuilt with Kemalist ideals, the AKP attempts to legitimize itself by claiming it will repair the damage it alleges Kemalism has caused to the people and their values. This major dilemma also stands as the most important mechanism of Türkiye's electoral and political culture. Both sides portray the upcoming elections as a life-or-death struggle, and therefore pressure voters to cast their ballots for them. Islamist conservatism, or political Islam, which began to rise with the Milli Görüş movement and the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP), can be said to have reached its peak with the AK Party governments in the early 2000s. It is important to note that the Turkish Constitutional Court dissolved the Welfare Party because it had become a “center of activities against the principle of secularism.”. Furthermore, Erdoğan, the founding leader of the AK Party, served as the Mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality after being nominated by the Welfare Party, which campaigned under the slogan " Fair Order." (adil düzen).
The banning of the Welfare Party was the first in a series of party bans implemented in Türkiye for religious reasons. Further, any separatist or generally revolutionary party threatened Turkish politics and was deemed an illegal party by the Constitutional Court. Türkiye's current President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as mentioned, was originally a member of the Welfare Party and used his status as an Islamist leader to garner support for his current party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP). This series of party bans led to the AKP gaining religious and political control.
The Battle for Hegemony: Replacing the Kemalist Narrative
The most dramatic change is the successful attempt to replace the core ideological foundation of the state with a new master narrative, Yeni Turkiye ("New Turkiye") (Christofis, 2018). The success of the AKP marks the emergence of the first counter-hegemonic force against Kemalist hegemony, a force that has gained a foothold in the state apparatus and society. This was achieved by strategically gaining international legitimacy from the USA and EU through promises of democracy and harmonisation, which was used against the internal Kemalist regime.
The AKP's new concept is a "comprehensive idea" and a counter-memory that challenges the dominant discourse of Kemalism, carrying with it almost "echoes of the empire." The new narrative is the recreation of a glorious Ottoman history and the creation of an imagined new Turkish identity composed of "devout Muslim Turks".
Erdogan's discourse divides the republic's history into two eras: the Kemalist period (Old Turkey) and the post-Kemalist/AKP era (Yeni Turkiye), positioning the new era as the antithesis and filling the vacuum of the authoritarian Kemalist reign. Especially, he challenged the significance of the Treaty of Lausanne (1922), calling it a betrayal that left the country too small, directly attacking the founder of Turkey and a cornerstone of the Kemalist narrative.
The AKP has always positioned Erdoğan and the events of their administration in a competitive position with Atatürk and the pre-AKP era. Perhaps one of the biggest events of the nearly quarter-century period under the AKP was the coup attempt that took place on July 15, 2016. In the face of a clear attack against President Erdoğan and the Turkish state, Erdoğan's leadership and the people's efforts were frequently emphasized in the aftermath of the coup attempt. Moreover, Erdoğan has called the July 15 coup attempt a second War of Independence.
Especially in the run-up to the last election, the AKP underscored the huge gap between their current administration and the Turkey of the past. President and AKP Chairman Erdoğan stated at election rallies: "Since 2002, we have fought all battles together. We have overcome difficulties together. We have resisted attempts at tutelage together. We have repelled the attacks of terrorist organizations together. On July 15th, we defended the national will together. Together, we have provided more service to Türkiye in the last 20 years than in the previous 80 years". Furthermore, looking at statements at different times by different members of Erdoğan's cabinet, they state that far more services have been provided in the last 20 years than in the previous 80 years, and that they have accomplished things that previous governments could not.
The AKP government cleverly discovered something that previous governments perhaps struggled to see. The Turkish people, in addition to restrictions particularly in the area of religion (e.g. 1997 Military Memorandum), were unable to access many basic services. One of the most important factors in the AKP's rise to power was undoubtedly its adoption of Islamic views and its promise of salvation through this path. But one of the main reasons why the AKP remained in power for almost a quarter of a century was that it provided people with services they could see with their own eyes and experience firsthand, services that would bring them tangible satisfaction. Services such as building hospitals, roads, bridges, cleaning up the piles of garbage left over from previous administrations, landscaping parks and gardens, and opening up opportunities for religious education, caused people to develop a great sense of belonging and commitment, both materially and spiritually.
This clearly shifted political debates, which in previous periods appealed more to a more educated class in terms of ideology and governance, to the grassroots level. In current Turkish society, regardless of educational background, everyone who supports or opposes the AKP shares certain common arguments. The fact that the AKP's raison d'être resonates with the people is what has enabled it to wield such immense power. The AKP bases its existence on Islamic roots, and it presents these roots as the roots of the Turkish people.
The AKP’s move dramatically changes the source of political authority by Islamicizing and Ottomanizing the Turkish leader tradition, deeming Atatürk worthy only as a gazi (victorious warrior) and cultivating a sultan-like personality cult for Erdogan. This includes columnist calls for Erdogan to be an updated caliph. Erdoğan has sometimes been compared to Abdulhamid II, and at other times to Atatürk. Great historical figures like Abdulhamid II were initially popularized among the public. Later, Erdoğan, portrayed as a follower of these great figures, ensured that the public rallied around a single name as their source of hope.
The shift in personnel, institutions, and legal apparatus represents a dramatic structural change, transferring power from the traditional Kemalist elite (the army and judiciary) to the new Islamist-conservative elite. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) were the "most important inheritor and sustaining power of the Kemalist regime". This change fundamentally involves a transfer of political authority from the traditional Kemalist elite to a newly emerging Islamist-conservative elite. Basically, the traditional Kemalist leaders have been replaced by a new group of Islamist-conservatives.
For decades, the Kemalist elite, primarily the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the judiciary, served as the most important protectors of the secular, unified Kemalist system started by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. This elite saw itself as the guardian of the constitution and often got involved, directly or indirectly, to "correct" what they thought went against Kemalist ideas of secularism and national unity.
The main point of this latest change is that the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) is no longer an active political force. The TSK used to be the strongest institution in Turkish politics, historically able and considered legitimate to stage coups, as it did many times in the 20th century. Taking away this protective role is a huge, permanent change in the power balance of the Republic of Turkey.
At the same time, the courts, another key part of the old elite, have also been significantly reorganized and lost some independence. The weakening political role of the Turkish Armed Forces and the changes to the judiciary show that the system of checks and balances that supported the Kemalist political system is being systematically dismantled. Investigations in cases such as Ergenekon and Balyoz were used to detain and imprison active and retired Kemalist military personnel, writers, and academics. Political Islamists arrested and judged the advocators and protectors of the Kemalist state, a situation that showed the Kemalist state's weakness in protecting itself. The army was weakened by the psychological tactics and trials.
The new Islamist-conservative leaders are benefiting from these institutional changes and are gaining more control over important state organizations. After Abdullah Gül became President in 2007, Islamist offices and appointments rapidly gained momentum in the Constitutional Court, Court of Appeal, Council of State, Higher Education Council (YÖK), and the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors (HSYK). This is not just a simple change of government; it's a complete shift in the state structure and the basic ideas behind power. A secular, military-supported structure has been replaced by one based on conservative religious and political principles. Amendments to the constitution, changed the structure of the supreme judicial bodies. The Kemalist state bodies, which sustained the constitutional order, are now "substantially controlled by the Islamist AKP”.
AKP governments exploited state institutions like tax experts to be an "element of oppression" against media bosses, ensuring compliance and the dismissal of opposing journalists, thus eroding one of the primary checks on power. The fact that people working for pro-government media outlets were given preferential treatment by the state, or that many state officials had close ties to these media organizations, enabled a high degree of public control. The AKP is using the same mechanisms of statecraft and the same emphasis on a pedagogic state that Kemalism used to inculcate its ideology. This is the central "continuation" aspect, but the content is the dramatic change.
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) fundamentally shifted the core ideology of the Turkish state, replacing the military, which had traditionally upheld Kemalist principles, with an emphasis on religion. This transformation was clearly reflected in the educational system through a series of key reforms. The mandatory "National Security Studies" course, previously created by the army, was eliminated, and "Turkish-Islamic Civilization" was established as the primary focus of the curriculum. Furthermore, new optional religious courses, such as "The Life of Prophet Muhammad" and "The Holy Qur’an," were introduced, while the teaching of Darwin's theory of evolution was removed. These changes were accompanied by the publication of new textbooks after 2012 that promoted a distinctly more conservative outlook. Ultimately, President Erdoğan himself implicitly criticized the founding father, Atatürk, for relying solely on rationalism and science.
It's important to remember that Erdoğan has repeatedly stated his goal of raising a religious generation since his office years as a prime minister. "We will raise a religious generation. Are you expecting a party with a conservative democratic identity to raise an atheist youth? (...) Our goal is a religious generation. I recently mentioned this to our Minister of National Education. We have projects in place for our Imam Hatip schools. During my time as Prime Minister, I said, "We will raise a religious generation," and some people went crazy. They said, "A Prime Minister cannot speak like that." I didn't understand why. That's how I set my goal as Prime Minister”.
Erdogan's discourse is subtly moving from ulus (nation in the Western, citizenship-based sense) back to millet (a society of Muslims from different ethnic groups dependent on a religious order). There is a desire to impose Islam as a super identity over Muslim ethnic identities (Turk, Kurd, Laz, etc.) and shape a new constitution into the nature of a "millet constitution". This is a profound ideological break from the secular foundations of the Republic. Erdoğan's and AK Party officials' radical statements regarding secularism, Kemalism, and military rule, can be understood through numerous other examples that could be the subject of pages of discussion.
CONCLUSION
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the era of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan represent a fundamental, structural, and ideological discontinuity in the history of the Turkish Republic. This period is a dramatic change, characterized not merely by a shift in government but by the systematic dismantling and replacement of the Kemalist state’s core foundations. The long-standing Kemalist master narrative was successfully challenged and supplanted by the counter-hegemonic discourse of Yeni Türkiye (“New Türkiye”).
This new narrative re-legitimizes Ottoman-Islamic history, emphasizes a conservative-religious identity, and positions Erdoğan's administration in direct, competitive opposition to the Republic’s founding figures. A dramatic transfer of political authority took place from the traditional Kemalist elite—primarily the military (TSK) and the judiciary—to a newly emerging Islamist-conservative elite.
This shift was solidified by constitutional amendments, trials, and key appointments, resulting in the depoliticization of the TSK and the co-optation of state institutions, thereby dismantling the traditional system of checks and balances. The AKP successfully leveraged deep-seated societal resentment against strict Kemalist secularism while simultaneously forging a powerful link with the grassroots population through the widespread provision of tangible services. This service-based politics, combined with an appeal to conservative Islamic roots, established a new form of populist legitimacy that transcended the previous elite-driven ideological debates.
In essence, the AKP has used the very mechanisms of a pedagogic state once employed by Kemalism, but to inculcate an entirely different content. The result is a profound break from the Republic’s secular-nationalist principles, replacing them with a conservative, religious-based political order that fundamentally remakes the social and political landscape of modern Türkiye.
Works Cited, Bibliography & References
Bilgiç, Tuba Ünlü, and Bestami S. Bilgiç. “‘Raising a Moral Generation’: The Republican People’s Party and Religious Instruction in Turkey, 1946-1949.” Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 53, no. 3, 2017, pp. 349–62.
Christofis, Nikos. "The AKP's "Yeni Turkiye": Challenging the Kemalist Narrative?" Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 29 no. 3, 2018, p. 11-32
Ciftci, Kemal. “The Kemalist Hegemony in Turkey and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) as an ‘Other'”. L'Europe en Formation, 2013/1 n° 367, 2013. p.143-169.
Guida, Michelangelo. “Turkish Politics: Making Sense of Nation, Identities, and Ideologies.” Orion, 2021.
Guida, Michelangelo. “Was Lausanne a Victory or a Defeat? Turkish Islamist Formation of National History in the Republican Era.” Sociology of Islam, 2025.
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